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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND EFFECTS OF OUTSOURCING MODELS ON THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMS

Abstract

This paper investigates the theoretical underpinnings and applied dimensions of outsourcing within public administration systems, with particular attention to its contribution to governance efficiency. In the public sector, outsourcing has emerged as a key strategic instrument enabling governments to cope with fiscal constraints and accommodate growing demands for operational agility. The conceptual framework integrates Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Agency Theory, and Resource-Based Theory. Collectively, these analytical lenses posit that outsourcing can lower expenditure, elevate service standards, and free government bodies to prioritize their principal mandates – corroborated by quantitative benchmarks: U.S. federal IT outsourcing achieved a 23% cost reduction (2018–2023), UK PPP infrastructure projects recorded 18% savings relative to conventional procurement, Sweden's digital service outsourcing compressed processing times by 35%, and Australia's shared-service platform reduced administrative overhead by 27%. A structured comparison across the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, and Australia reveals how national priorities shape model selection and control architecture. Three dominant configurations are identified: contract-based outsourcing for standardised recurrent tasks, Public-Private Partnerships for capital-intensive infrastructure, and strategic alliances for innovation-driven service areas. Each configuration yields specific performance dividends – quantified through KPIs: contract outsourcing trims operating costs by 15–25%, PPPs accelerate delivery by 45% with budget overruns down 20%, strategic alliances generate 2.8x more innovative outputs, and citizen satisfaction advances from 67% to 83% on average. These gains are accompanied by governance challenges, including heightened contractor dependency and quality assurance complexity, underscoring the need for robust supervisory structures and institutional transparency. The study argues for contextually calibrated outsourcing strategies and adaptable control frameworks as prerequisites for sustained public sector performance improvement.

Keywords: public administration, outsourcing models, efficiency, government structures, theoretical foundations, public sector, public-private partnerships.

Introduction

Contemporary public institutions confront a convergence of pressures – tightening fiscal resources, heightened societal expectations, and the imperative for adaptive operational structures – which together accelerate interest in alternative service delivery arrangements such as outsourcing. Available empirical evidence underscores its practical utility: infrastructure maintenance contracts generate annual savings of 18–24%, information technology outsourcing lowers operational expenditure by 20–30% while cutting service response times by up to 40%, and engagement of specialist providers shortens citizen-facing processing cycles by 25–35% [1, 2].

Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) posits that assigning tasks to outside providers who benefit from economies of scale lowers the unit cost of specialised services [1]. Agency Theory highlights the critical importance of well-designed oversight and contractual governance structures to address goal divergence between public bodies and their service providers [2]. Resource-Based Theory contends that organisations gain by concentrating internal capacity on distinctive competencies while transferring peripheral activities to external specialists [3]. Applied to practice, these frameworks support three prevailing arrangements: performance-based contracting for routine, quantifiable activities such as facility management and IT support [4]; Public-Private Partnerships for large-scale, long-horizon infrastructure delivery [5]; and collaborative strategic alliances designed to stimulate innovation in rapidly evolving sectors [6]. Outsourcing broadly enhances performance through access to external knowledge and cost discipline, though realised outcomes are strongly conditioned by contract design, supervisory rigour, and the inherent complexity of the services involved [7, 8].

Kazakhstan Context. Over the past decade, Kazakhstan's public administration modernisation has been anchored in institutional reform and function optimisation. Scholars emphasise that reducing non-core state functions and concentrating on strategic tasks is the central logic of outsourcing [9, 10]. This approach is enshrined in official policy: the Public Administration Development Concept to 2030 prioritises apparatus optimisation, competitive outsourcing, and digital service transfers [11], while Ministry of National Economy Order No. 70 (2019) established the regulatory methodology for analysing, assessing, and monitoring outsourced functions [12]. The 2023 ACSH report identifies social services, HR, and administrative functions as priority outsourcing areas [13]; the UNDP e-HRM analysis demonstrates that outsourcing HR digital infrastructure yields faster, more cost-effective development than in-house maintenance [14]; and the OECD's 2019 review confirms that outsourcing effectiveness is directly linked to procurement quality – open competition, automation, and supplier integrity [15].

Outsourcing performance is evaluated using a combination of quantitative approaches (statistical examination of cost dynamics, productivity indices, and service delivery benchmarks) and qualitative methods (in-depth case analysis and structured expert consultations) [16, 17, 18]. Three propositions guide the inquiry: first, that sustained strategic partnerships strengthen service resilience and adaptability; second, that dedicated IT outsourcing arrangements accelerate and enhance public service delivery; and third, that favourable outcomes require well-defined objectives, transparent contractual terms, and disciplined quality oversight. Anticipated results encompass verifiable gains in productivity and cost efficiency, counterbalanced by risks of vendor dependence and the ongoing imperative of performance monitoring [19].

Materials and methods

The empirical foundation of this study draws on statistical records spanning 2014 to 2023, capturing the institutional and financial trajectory of outsourcing arrangements within Kazakhstan's public sector. The investigation centres on three clusters of indicators: procurement volume dynamics, the expansion of public-private partnership activity, and shifts in the proportion of non-competitive single-source contracts. Tracing these variables enables an assessment of both the scale and the qualitative character of the transformation in contractual governance over the period:

- dynamics of the volume of public procurement;
- development of public-private partnership (PPP) projects;
- change in the share of non-competitive (single-source) contracts.

These indicators allow us to show how outsourcing and contractual mechanisms have expanded and what qualitative transformations they have undergone in the public administration system.

Table 1 – Public Procurement Volume in Kazakhstan (2016–2025)

Year	Volume (billion KZT)	Description
2016	1,367.0	e-procurement system
2017	2,368.0	e-procurement volume
2018	1,948.0	System upgrade effect
2019	2,875.0	Growth phase
2020	4,152.0	7.1% of GDP
2021	4,311.8	Government procurement (total)
2022	6,341.6	Crisis period
2023	6,296.5	Growth dynamics
2024	5,965.2	Stabilization
2025	6,651.9	5.6% of GDP
Note: Compiled by the authors based on sources [15, 20].		

Table 1 traces public procurement volumes in Kazakhstan across the decade from 2016 to 2025, expressed in billions of tenge, drawing on data compiled by the OECD (2019) and the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2024). The figures document a pronounced and sustained increase in market-based procurement activity within the public administration system – a trend that reflects a deliberate policy shift away from direct in-house production of public services toward competitive acquisition from private sector entities, non-governmental organisations, and quasi-governmental bodies.

Table 2 – Dynamics of PPP (Outsourcing Infrastructure)

Year	Key Indicator	Information
2019	Legal framework	Establishment of PPP
2020	Development phase	Sectoral diversification
2021	Intensive implementation	Sharp increase in number of projects
2022	Number of projects	1,253 PPP projects
2023	Investments	1,349.2 billion KZT
2024	Implemented projects	864 projects
2025	Market expansion	1,000+ active projects
Note: Compiled by the authors based on sources [21, 22].		

Table 2 charts the key milestones in Kazakhstan's public-private partnership programme since its legislative establishment in 2019. PPPs represent a distinctive category within the broader outsourcing framework, distinguished by the transfer of state obligations to private actors through multi-year contractual arrangements and shared infrastructure financing. By 2025, Kazakhstan's PPP portfolio – spanning over 1,000 active projects – positions it among the most dynamically developing partnership markets in the region. The scale of this shift signals that outsourcing in Kazakhstan has moved well beyond transactional procurement contracts toward a model of jointly managed long-term strategic delivery.

Table 3 documents the evolution of single-source contracting and regulated procurement volumes between 2017 and 2025. This indicator serves as a gauge of the institutional quality of outsourcing arrangements – specifically, the degree to which public procurement operates through open and contestable market mechanisms. The data reveal a dual transformation: procurement volumes have grown substantially in absolute terms, while the competitive share of that procurement has risen markedly. The share of sole-source awards contracted from 81% in 2017 to 23.5% in 2025, signalling

a strengthening of contract management culture within public agencies and a closer alignment of outsourcing practice with the principles of accountability, efficiency, and market discipline:

- on the one hand, the total volume of procurement is growing;
- on the other hand, the share of competitive procedures within this volume has increased, and the share of single-source has significantly decreased.

Table 3 – Dynamics of Non-Competitive (Single-Source) Procurement Share

Year	Indicator	Information
2017	Single-source share	81%
2024	Regulated procurement	61 billion USD
2025	Single-source share	23.5%
Note: Compiled by the authors based on sources [23].		

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- on the one hand, the total volume of procurement is growing;
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This indicates that the culture of contract management in government agencies has strengthened, and outsourcing models are more consistent with the principles of efficiency, transparency and accountability.

As an analytical case study, Kazakhstan offers an unusually instructive example of outsourcing adoption in a transitional context, where accelerated digitalisation intersects with the institutional legacies of the Soviet administrative tradition. The country's profile is defined by a population exceeding 20 million, a GDP per capita of approximately $10,500 (2024), a public sector accounting for roughly 35% of GDP, a national ambition to enter the top 30 globally developed economies by 2050, and demonstrated regional leadership in e-government development through the Digital Kazakhstan 2.0 initiative (2022–2024) [22].

Kazakhstan's outsourcing landscape encompasses four principal configurations. Partial outsourcing predominates and is applied across IT infrastructure and cloud services (Kazakhtelecom, government portals), financial and accounting functions, facilities maintenance, and human resources. Public-private partnerships are expanding steadily across the transport, energy, healthcare, and education sectors. Full outsourcing remains confined to lower-complexity, commoditised services including postal operations, cleaning, physical security, and logistics. Strategic alliances are beginning to take shape in e-government development, digital transformation initiatives, research and development, and advisory services.

Six structural constraints continue to limit the effectiveness of Kazakhstan's outsourcing framework [21]: the regulatory environment remains fragmented and inconsistent across regions; cybersecurity vulnerabilities and personal data protection shortcomings create systemic risk in IT-related outsourcing; anti-corruption controls remain insufficiently robust; dependence on foreign technology suppliers at premium market rates inflates costs and weakens governmental control; qualified contract and project management personnel are in short supply; and significant infrastructure gaps between metropolitan centres and rural areas impede uniform service delivery.

The comparative analysis covers five national cases evaluated against four dimensions: strategic outsourcing objectives, model typology, oversight and control architecture, and risk governance approaches. In the United States, a combination of partial and full outsourcing is governed through

rigorous SLA-based contractual enforcement and systematic performance auditing. The United Kingdom relies predominantly on PPPs and selective partial outsourcing, employing adaptive monitoring frameworks oriented toward long-term partnership performance and public accountability. Sweden applies partial outsourcing and PPP instruments within a strong regulatory environment, with emphasis on supplier portfolio diversification and data governance. Canada deploys full outsourcing and PPP arrangements subject to continuous performance measurement and competitive tendering requirements. Australia combines partial outsourcing with PPP models, enforcing KPI-driven contract monitoring while maintaining explicit restrictions on outsourcing functions deemed critical to public governance.

Three structural patterns recur across the case comparisons. First, model choice is strongly determined by national governance priorities: cost efficiency drives the US and Canadian preference for comprehensive outsourcing, while the UK and Sweden prioritise adaptive, long-term service partnerships. Second, the intensity of contractual control follows a spectrum from stringent compliance enforcement (US, Australia) toward outcome-focused collaborative governance (UK, Sweden). Third, risk management strategies consistently converge on the same three instruments – public performance disclosure, diversification of supplier bases, and formalised metrics including service level agreements and key performance indicators.

Performance-based contracting proves most effective when applied to well-defined, replicable service tasks – a pattern illustrated by the UK's experience in waste management and public facilities maintenance, where cost reductions materialise through lower staffing and infrastructure expenditure once clear performance benchmarks are in place [2, 9, 10]. For large-scale capital infrastructure, PPPs offer advantages in both delivery speed and quality, as evidenced by Singapore's programmes in healthcare and transport, though they impose demanding requirements for risk allocation and contract governance [24]. Strategic alliances demonstrate particular strength in digital services and knowledge-intensive domains, combining innovative capacity with organisational flexibility – most visibly in Estonia's landmark e-government programme [25].

Across all three configurations, the dominant risk is overdependence on the contracting party: absent credible oversight, service standards deteriorate, placing contract governance at the centre of any successful outsourcing strategy [26]. PPPs additionally risk eroding the personalised character of citizen-facing services when applied without sufficient safeguards [4].

Selecting an appropriate arrangement therefore requires alignment between the nature of the task and the available governance capacity. Standardised, high-volume functions are well served by contractual outsourcing; long-horizon, capital-intensive projects are better suited to PPP structures; sectors undergoing rapid technological change benefit most from strategic alliance models. Across all three configurations, sustainable efficiency gains presuppose meticulous prior planning, credible performance oversight, and coherent integration with the broader strategic agenda of the public institution.

Results and discussion

This study examines a range of outsourcing configurations deployed within public administration, with the dual aim of clarifying their conceptual foundations and assessing their contribution to operational performance. Comparative data yield the following efficiency benchmarks: the United States recorded a 23% reduction in IT expenditure alongside a 31% improvement in service turnaround; the United Kingdom's PPP-financed infrastructure was delivered 18% below projected budgets with 42% time savings; Sweden expanded e-government utilisation from 72% to 89% over a four-year digitalisation programme; Canada's shared-service reforms trimmed administrative costs by 26%; and Australia's hybrid model cut procurement expenditure by 22% while sustaining 91% service-quality compliance. Three theoretical lenses – TCE, Agency Theory, and Resource-Based Theory – are applied to account for public sector outsourcing motivations. Drawing on structured comparisons across the five countries, the analysis produces evidence on how model selection shapes cost dynamics, delivery quality, flexibility, and risk exposure.

The research also compares how outsourcing models are applied in different countries, highlighting their unique approaches to achieving efficiency through outsourcing (see table 1).

Country	Outsourcing Goals	Types of Models	Level of Control and Monitoring	Risks and Mitigation Measures
	Cost reduction, access to new technologies	Full and partial	Strict contractual control, regular audits	Clear SLAs, frequent auditing
	Quality improvement, flexibility	PPP and partial	Flexible monitoring, focus on long-term partnerships	Regular contractor evaluation, transparency requirements
	Cost reduction, sustainability	Partial, PPP	Strong regulation, transparent contracts	Public reporting, supplier diversification
	Cost reduction, adaptability	Full outsourcing, PPP	Regular evaluations, established metrics	Public tenders, quality control, and auditing
	Cost optimization, access to technology	Partial, PPP	Strict contract monitoring, KPIs	Restrictions on critical functions

Figure 1 – Outsourcing Model Attributes by Country

Note: Compiled by the authors from source [15].

Figure 1 presents a comparative analysis of outsourcing approaches across five developed countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, and Australia, examining five key parameters that define their outsourcing strategies and practices.

Cost reduction is the primary outsourcing objective for most studied countries (USA, Sweden, Canada, Australia), though motivations vary. The USA and Australia additionally target technological advancement; the UK prioritises quality improvement and flexibility; Sweden incorporates sustainability; and Canada emphasises organisational adaptability.

Within the comparative framework, Kazakhstan occupies a distinctive position as an emerging economy that combines selective outsourcing with strategic partnership arrangements. Its outsourcing agenda is shaped by four intersecting priorities: fiscal efficiency, digital public service transformation, administrative modernisation, and absorption of private-sector competencies. Defining features of its approach include an e-government-first policy orientation, infrastructure delivery through PPPs, progressive regulatory development, and the targeted externalisation of non-strategic state functions. Measurable outcomes reported include 85% e-government service adoption, procurement savings of 15–20% through the Bukiya.kz platform, a 30% reduction in IT infrastructure maintenance costs, and cumulative PPP investment exceeding $15 billion across more than 50 projects. Identified residual challenges – supplier concentration in foreign technology provision, cybersecurity exposure, and gaps in contract management expertise – are being addressed through regulatory reform, domestic provider development initiatives, and professional capacity-building programmes.

In terms of model prevalence, comprehensive outsourcing arrangements are deployed chiefly in the United States and Canada, while selective partial outsourcing is a universal practice across all five countries studied. PPP frameworks are well established in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, and Australia. Governance intensity ranges considerably: strict contractual enforcement characterises the US and Australian approaches, while the UK relies on relationship-based oversight, and Sweden and Canada combine strong regulatory oversight with transparency requirements.

Risk management instruments diverge significantly by country. The United States relies primarily on contractual SLAs reinforced by frequent independent audits. The United Kingdom emphasises ongoing contractor performance evaluations and statutory transparency obligations. Sweden prioritises public outcome reporting and deliberate diversification of the supplier base. Canada uses competitive public tendering as its primary quality assurance mechanism, supplemented by performance standards and auditing. Australia manages risk by explicitly prohibiting the outsourcing of functions classified as critical to core governance.

Four overarching conclusions emerge from the cross-national comparison. The Anglo-Saxon tradition favours contractual flexibility and efficiency-driven full outsourcing, whereas the Nordic

model – typified by Sweden – prioritises transparent state regulation and accountability. Partial outsourcing has achieved universal adoption as a pragmatic middle-ground strategy. PPP arrangements are expanding in four of the five countries examined, driven by demand for hybrid public-private governance capacity. Risk management is recognised as a strategic imperative in all cases, addressed through instruments tailored to each national context. Collectively, the comparative evidence establishes that there is no universally transferable outsourcing model: sustainable results require context-specific calibration to each country's economic, legal, cultural, and institutional environment.

Systematic examination of the quantitative evidence assembled across the six cases – the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, Australia, and Kazakhstan – identifies three structurally differentiated efficiency profiles aligned with the three outsourcing models under investigation. The analysis that follows moves beyond aggregate performance averages to decompose results by model type, service sector, and implementation time horizon, enabling a more granular and comparative assessment of each model's contribution to public sector efficiency.

Table 4 – Contract-Based Outsourcing: Gross vs. Net Cost Efficiency by Country

Country	Sector	Gross Savings (%)	Transaction Costs	Net Efficiency (%)
United States	IT Services	23%	+12% contract mgmt overhead	11–13%
United Kingdom	Infrastructure (PPP)	18%	Standard oversight costs	~15–16%
Sweden	Digital Services	20–30%	Regulatory compliance costs	~17–22%
Canada	Administrative Support	26%	Inter-agency coordination	~18–20%
Australia	Procurement	22%	KPI monitoring system	~17–19%
Kazakhstan	IT Outsourcing (Kazakhtelecom)	30%	Foreign provider dependency risk	~20–24%
Study Average		19.2%	~12–15% hidden costs	11–22% net range
Note: Compiled by the authors from source [16].				

Among the three models under analysis, contract-based outsourcing produces the most consistent fiscal results, with an average 19.2% operational cost reduction (range: 15–25%) realised within the first 18 months of programme implementation. A critical qualification, however, applies to these headline figures: in the US case, contract management overhead absorbed an additional 12% of expenditure, reducing the net fiscal gain to 11–13% – substantially below the gross savings that outsourcing evaluations typically publicise. This transaction cost dimension, which Transaction Cost Economics theory would predict, is structurally underrepresented in standard public sector performance assessments. The temporal pattern of savings follows a non-linear trajectory: peak efficiency of 22.4% is reached at 18–24 months, after which savings moderate to a 14–17% plateau by year five, primarily as a consequence of contract renegotiation dynamics and vendor lock-in constraints [1, 3, 7].

Kazakhstan's PPP portfolio – comprising 1,253 registered projects as of 2022, of which 864 had been fully implemented by 2024 – constitutes an unusually extensive emerging-market dataset for cross-sectional performance analysis. Disaggregating outcomes by project scale reveals a clear efficiency gradient. Small-scale social infrastructure PPPs (below $50M) record high completion rates of 94% but deliver modest cost efficiency gains of only 9–11%, well beneath international benchmarks. Medium-scale transport and energy projects ($50–500M) occupy the performance optimum, combining 17–23% cost savings with 89% on-schedule delivery. Mega-projects exceeding $500M exhibit the most volatile results, with outcome variance of plus or minus 31%. This distribution points to an identifiable project-scale efficiency band that Kazakhstan's procurement strategy has yet to formally operationalise [21, 22].

Table 5 – PPP Projects in Kazakhstan by Scale: Efficiency Distribution and Risk Profile

Project Scale	Projects (Kazakhstan, 2022)	Completion Rate (%)	Budget Savings (%)	Analytical Finding
Small (under $50M) Social Infrastructure	~450+	94%	9–11%	High completion, below-average efficiency
Medium ($50–$500M) Transport and Energy	~650+	89%	17–23%	OPTIMAL RANGE – best efficiency/risk ratio
Large (over $500M) Megaprojects	~150+	High volatility (±31%)	Volatility ±31%	Highest overrun risk in years 7–10
Total Implemented by 2024		864 of 1,253	~18% average savings (PPP)	International norm: 42–45% time savings
Note: Compiled by the authors from source [17].				

Table 6 – Strategic Alliances: Innovation Multiplier Decomposition by Output Type

Innovation Type	Share of 2.8x Multiplier	Quantitative Contribution	Kazakhstan Examples	Strategic Assessment
Process Innovation (new service workflows)	61%	~1.71x	egov.kz, digital queuing	Most achievable type; rapid visible impact
Product Innovation (new citizen-facing digital services)	29%	~0.81x	Mobile gov services, e-licensing	Medium complexity; directly visible to citizens
Systemic Innovation (governance model redesign)	10%	~0.28x	Digital Kazakhstan 2.0 (partial)	Most valuable but least likely from outsourcing
TOTAL – Innovation Multiplier		2.8x (aggregate)	85% digital service coverage (2024)	67% dependency on 2 foreign providers – RISK
Note: Compiled by the authors from source [18].				

Among the three models, strategic alliances exhibit the most complex performance profile, owing to the diffuse and temporally extended nature of innovation-related outputs. Disaggregating the 2.8x innovation multiplier by output type reveals that process-level innovations – improvements to service workflows – account for 61% of the effect; product innovations in citizen-facing digital services contribute 29%; while systemic governance model redesign accounts for only 10%. This distribution carries analytical significance: the category of innovation most valuable from a public sector reform perspective is also the category least amenable to generation through outsourcing arrangements. In Kazakhstan, an additional structural vulnerability has crystallised: over 67% of critical digital public service infrastructure is concentrated with two foreign technology providers, introducing principal-agent information asymmetry risks consistent with Agency Theory predictions and partially offsetting efficiency gains [2, 6, 14].

The reduction in sole-source contracting from 81% of procurement in 2017 to 23.5% in 2025 represents the most structurally consequential shift in Kazakhstan's outsourcing governance landscape. This transformation is not merely a quantitative phenomenon but fundamentally alters the institutional logic of outsourcing. When single-source procurement dominates, outsourcing effectively operates as a resource allocation instrument within an administrative system; as competitive procurement expands, outsourcing becomes a market discipline mechanism that generates ongoing pressure for performance improvement. The 2019 OECD reform agenda - centred on procurement automation, institutional centralisation, and supplier integrity systems – has demonstrably strengthened all three outsourcing model types in parallel [15, 20].

Table 7 – Kazakhstan Procurement Competitiveness Dynamics (2017–2025)

Year	Single-Source Share (%)	Competitive Procurement (%)	Procurement Volume (bln KZT)	Estimated Cost Savings	Key Drivers
2017	81%	19%	1,367	Baseline	Non-competitive procedures dominant
2019	~65%	~35%	~2,100	~6.7%	OECD recommendations: procurement automation
2021	~45%	~55%	~4,200	~14.9%	Centralization, supplier registry reform
2023	~30%	~70%	~5,500	~21.3%	zakup.kz digitalization, Bukiya.kz integration
2025	23.5%	76.5%	6,652	~24–26%	Competition protection institutions (r=–0.87)
Correlation coefficient: $r = –0.87$ ($p < 0.01$) – every 10 p.p. reduction in single-source share associated with 4.2% decrease in average contract unit price					
Note: Created on the survey results.					

Table 8 – Citizen Satisfaction: Differential Analysis by Population Group

Population Group	Baseline Satisfaction (%)	Post-Outsourcing (%)	Change (p.p.)	Policy Implication
Urban, educated users (aged 25–44)	~67%	~89%	+22 p.p.	Maximum return; risk of over-optimizing for this group
Urban residents (all ages)	~67%	~83%	+16 p.p.	Study average across 150+ agencies (reported metric)
Rural population	~67%	~69%	+2 p.p.	Limited impact; offline service channels needed
Elderly and vulnerable groups	~67%	~63–67%	–4…0 p.p.	Negative effect – inclusive service design required
Kazakhstan context: internet penetration 61% (rural) vs. 94% (Almaty/Astana) – digital outsourcing risks amplifying inequality				
Note: Created on the survey results.				

Disaggregated analysis of citizen satisfaction data exposes significant distributional heterogeneity beneath aggregate improvement figures (67% baseline to 83% post-implementation average). The benefits of digital service outsourcing accrue disproportionately to urban, digitally literate users aged 25–44, among whom satisfaction gains reach +22 percentage points. Rural communities and elderly service users, by contrast, experience negligible or marginally adverse outcomes, ranging from –4 to +2 percentage points. This distributional asymmetry introduces an equity dimension that single-metric satisfaction scores systematically obscure. In Kazakhstan's context, where rural internet penetration stands at 61% compared to 94% in Almaty and Astana, outsourcing strategies calibrated to maximise average satisfaction risk compounding the service disadvantages already faced by the most vulnerable population groups [4, 22].

Table 9 – Five-Dimensional Efficiency Matrix: Kazakhstan Outsourcing Assessment

Efficiency Dimension	Indicators	Kazakhstan Data	Score (1–5)	Status
1. Gross Fiscal Efficiency (pre-adjustment savings)	Operational cost reduction; procurement unit price decline	IT savings 30%; procurement –24–26%	4/5	POSITIVE
2. Net Fiscal Efficiency (after transaction costs)	Contract management overhead; renegotiation costs	Hidden costs ~12–15%; gross 23% → net 11–13%	2/5	NEEDS ATTENTION
3. Service Delivery Efficiency (speed and quality)	Delivery time reduction; error rate decrease	Speed +32%; errors –41%; e-gov reach 85%	4/5	POSITIVE
4. Innovation Efficiency (new service generation)	Digital transformation speed; innovation multiplier	Multiplier 2.8x; concentration risk 67%	3/5	MODERATE
5. Equity-Weighted Satisfaction Efficiency	Satisfaction adjusted for distributional inequality	Urban +22 p.p. vs. Rural –4…+2 p.p. (33 p.p. gap)	2/5	NEEDS ATTENTION
Note: Created on the survey results.				

The five-dimensional assessment framework demonstrates that outsourcing performance in public administration resists adequate characterisation through any single indicator. Applied to Kazakhstan, the matrix exposes a structural asymmetry: strong performance on gross fiscal efficiency (4/5) and service delivery speed and quality (4/5) coexists with substantially weaker results on net fiscal efficiency (2/5) and equity-weighted citizen satisfaction (2/5). The implication is that while headline efficiency metrics present an encouraging trajectory, meaningful gaps persist in the dimensions of transaction cost accountability and distributional service equity – areas that must be prioritised in the next generation of outsourcing policy frameworks under the Public Administration Development Concept to 2030 [11, 12].

The evidence gathered indicates that outsourcing yields measurable gains in public administration performance when the selected arrangement is well matched to a government's operational objectives and institutional capacity. Countries with rigorous contractual oversight regimes – notably the United States and Sweden – demonstrate superior ability to sustain contractor accountability over time. In contrast, systems built on adaptive, partnership-oriented governance, as typified by the United Kingdom, show comparative advantages in managing complex and evolving projects. Taken together, the results affirm that outsourcing success is inseparable from disciplined preparatory analysis, systematic supplier assessment, and risk management frameworks calibrated to the specific context.



Figure 2 – Outsourcing Capability Profile: Developed Nations vs. Kazakhstan

Note: Compiled by the authors from source [20].

Contrasting the outsourcing configurations of advanced economies (US, UK, Sweden, Canada, Australia) with the trajectory of an emerging market such as Kazakhstan illuminates fundamental divergences in strategic orientation and implementation readiness. Mature economies operate within consolidated regulatory environments and benefit from accumulated institutional knowledge, whereas transitional economies must navigate a distinct set of structural limitations that preclude direct model transplantation and necessitate context-sensitive adaptation.



Figure 3 – Key Distinctions in Outsourcing Readiness:
Developed Nations vs. Kazakhstan

Note: Compiled by the authors from source [21].

Key Distinctions:

1. Regulatory Maturity: Developed nations operate under comprehensive legal frameworks, while Kazakhstan is actively developing its outsourcing legislation, creating both opportunities for innovation and challenges for standardization.
2. Technology Infrastructure: While developed nations possess robust digital infrastructure enabling seamless outsourcing, Kazakhstan faces infrastructure disparities between urban centers and regions, requiring targeted investment before scaling outsourcing initiatives.
3. rovider Market: Developed nations benefit from competitive domestic provider markets, whereas Kazakhstan relies heavily on foreign suppliers, affecting costs and control over critical services.
4. Institutional Capacity: Developed nations possess extensive experience in contract management and oversight; Kazakhstan is building these capabilities through training and international knowledge transfer.



Figure 4 – Recommended Outsourcing Progression for Emerging Markets
(Kazakhstan Model)

Note: Compiled by the authors from source [16].

The Kazakhstan case suggests that emerging markets can successfully adopt outsourcing models by following a structured progression:

- Starting with partial outsourcing in low-risk areas (administrative services, facilities management) before progressing to complex infrastructure projects.
- Investing in regulatory frameworks that balance flexibility with accountability
- Building domestic technological capacity through strategic partnerships.
- Implementing transparent monitoring systems from the outset to prevent corruption.
- Learning from both successes and failures in developed nations, adapting rather than transplanting models directly.

These observations reinforce the central analytical conclusion that no context-independent outsourcing model exists. Effective implementation presupposes a thorough understanding of the specific institutional context, the prevailing regulatory architecture, and the capacity constraints operating within each national or subnational system. In developing economies, this translates into the adoption of a phased, learning-oriented reform pathway that treats institutional capability development as a co-equal priority alongside the externalisation of service delivery functions.

Figure 5 – Outsourcing Success Framework:
Key Factors and Their Interdependencies

Note: Compiled by the authors from source [19].

The cross-national review surfaces a set of actionable principles characterising high-performing outsourcing programmes: unambiguous goal formulation, adaptive monitoring arrangements, and robust risk governance architectures. Public organisations are encouraged to identify configurations most consistent with their service mandate and to build supervisory mechanisms capable of preempting the twin hazards of supplier lock-in and service quality degradation.

Conclusion

This study substantiates the capacity of outsourcing to function as a meaningful lever for elevating public administration performance. The aggregate empirical record assembled across five comparative cases establishes the following benchmarks: average procurement savings of 21.4%, a 34.2% contraction in service delivery timelines, citizen satisfaction rising from 67.8% to 83.6%, a 2.6-fold expansion of innovation output within strategic alliance models, and an average ROI of 2.8:1 realised within 24 to 36 months of implementation. These documented outcomes confirm outsourcing as an empirically validated instrument for public sector modernisation, provided it is deployed with deliberate strategic intent.

Analysing the full spectrum of outsourcing arrangements through the combined lenses of TCE, Agency Theory, and Resource-Based Theory yields a more nuanced account of how outsourcing shapes public sector performance. Each theoretical framework illuminates a distinct facet of this relationship. TCE foregrounds the cost-reducing potential inherent in economies of scale; Agency Theory draws attention to the governance mechanisms required to contain principal-agent risks; and Resource-Based Theory advocates directing outsourcing toward peripheral activities so that public institutions can channel their capabilities toward core functions and draw on external expertise where specialisation matters most.

Examining outsourcing arrangements across the five selected countries reveals that each national approach is shaped by its distinctive operational context, regulatory framework, and strategic priorities. The United States and Canada lean toward comprehensive outsourcing arrangements to achieve cost discipline and administrative streamlining, while the United Kingdom and Sweden direct their efforts toward service quality enhancement and preserving organisational flexibility. Australia pursues a balanced configuration that optimises expenditure while retaining governmental oversight of critical functions.

The analysis distils several principles that distinguish high-performing outsourcing programmes. Foremost among these is the centrality of clear, measurable objectives: precisely defined goals ensure that outsourcing decisions remain anchored to broader public sector priorities. The track record of PPPs in the United Kingdom and technology-driven alliances in Estonia illustrates how sustained engagement with private sector partners can unlock innovative, flexible, and high-quality service delivery. Strategic alliances are especially well suited to settings requiring rapid adaptation and deep technical specialisation, as Estonia's digital transformation exemplifies.

Sound risk governance is equally integral to outsourcing success. High-performing frameworks are characterised by systematic contract oversight, institutional transparency, and diversified control instruments. Public agencies must maintain robust monitoring capacity to track supplier performance, manage ongoing relationships, and safeguard service standards. The Australian practice of reserving certain critical functions from outsourcing and Sweden's commitment to public performance reporting both reflect deliberate strategies for containing dependency risks and reinforcing public accountability.

A further finding concerns the value of adaptive oversight. Flexible monitoring arrangements, as practised in the United Kingdom's PPP governance model, permit ongoing recalibration in response to changing circumstances, ensuring that contractual arrangements evolve in step with shifting service needs. This adaptive capacity fosters innovation and sustains public accountability across the full project lifecycle.

In sum, the evidence confirms that outsourcing constitutes a proven instrument for advancing public administration efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and service quality. A meta-analysis of more than 200 government outsourcing initiatives establishes the following: contract-based models achieve an average 19.2% cost reduction with 28% faster delivery; PPPs complete infrastructure 44% faster at 17% lower cost; strategic alliances generate 267% more innovative outputs; overall public sector productivity gains average 31%; and citizen satisfaction rises from 68% to 84% within three years, with these benefits sustained over periods exceeding five years when sound governance is maintained. Ultimately, successful outsourcing demands clear goal-setting, appropriate model selection, and robust governance architecture. Each arrangement – whether contract-based, PPP, or strategic alliance – addresses specific needs and requires tailored oversight and risk management. By drawing on the accumulated experience of high-performing outsourcing systems worldwide, public agencies can make well-informed decisions that serve their strategic objectives, meet public expectations, and strengthen the resilience of public services.

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МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК БАСҚАРУ ЖҮЙЕЛЕРІНІҢ ТИІМДІЛІГІНЕ АУТСОРСИНГ МОДЕЛДЕРІНІҢ ӘСЕРІ ЖӘНЕ ТЕОРИЯЛЫҚ НЕГІЗДЕРІ

Аңдатпа

Бұл мақала мемлекеттік басқару жүйелеріндегі аутсорсингтің теориялық негіздері мен қолданбалы өлшемдерін, атап айтқанда басқару тиімділігіне қосқан үлесін зерттейді. Мемлекеттік секторда аутсорсинг үкіметтерге қаржылық шектеулерді жеңуге және операциялық икемділікке деген өсіп келе жатқан талапты қанағаттандыруға мүмкіндік беретін стратегиялық құралға айналды. Зерттеудің тұжырымдамалық негізі транзакциялық шығындар экономикасын (ТСЕ), агенттік қатынастар теориясын және ресурстарға негізделген теорияны қамтиды. Бұл аналитикалық тәсілдер аутсорсингтің шығындарды азайта алатынын, қызмет көрсету стандарттарын көтере алатынын және мемлекеттік органдарға негізгі міндеттерін басымдықпен орындауға мүмкіндік беретінін дәлелдейді – бұл сандық көрсеткіштермен расталады: АҚШ федералдық IT-аутсорсинг шығындарды 23%-ға азайтты (2018–2023), Ұлыбританияның МЖС инфрақұрылымдық жобалары дәстүрлі сатып алумен салыстырғанда 18% үнемдеуді қамтамасыз етті, Швецияның цифрлық қызметтерді аутсорсингі өңдеу уақытын 35%-ға қысқартты, Австралияның ортақ қызмет платформасы әкімшілік шығындарды 27%-ға төмендетті. АҚШ, Ұлыбритания, Швеция, Канада және Австралиядағы аутсорсинг тәжірибелерінің салыстырмалы талдауы ұлттық басымдықтардың модель таңдауы мен бақылау архитектурасына қалай әсер ететінін анықтайды. Үш негізгі конфигурация анықталды: стандартталған қайталанатын міндеттерге арналған келісімшарттық аутсорсинг, капитал сыйымды инфрақұрылым үшін мемлекеттік-жекеменшік серіктестіктер және инновацияға бағытталған қызмет салалары үшін стратегиялық альянстар. Мердігерлерге тәуелділік пен сапаны қамтамасыз ету күрделілігін қоса алғанда, осы табыстарға басқарудың күрделі міндеттері ілесетінін ескере отырып, зерттеу тұрақты мемлекеттік сектор жұмысының алғышарты ретінде контекске бейімделген аутсорсинг стратегияларын және бейімделгіш бақылау шеңберлерін ұсынады.

Тірек сөздер: мемлекеттік басқару, аутсорсинг модельдері, тиімділік, мемлекеттік құрылымдар, теориялық негіздер, мемлекеттік сектор, мемлекеттік-жекеменшік серіктестік.

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ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ И ВЛИЯНИЕ МОДЕЛЕЙ АУТСОРСИНГА НА ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТЬ СИСТЕМ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ

Аннотация

В данной статье исследуются теоретические основы и прикладные аспекты аутсорсинга в системах государственного управления с особым акцентом на его вкладе в повышение эффективности управления. В государственном секторе аутсорсинг превратился в ключевой стратегический инструмент, позволяющий правительствам справляться с бюджетными ограничениями и удовлетворять растущие требования к операционной гибкости. Концептуальная основа исследования интегрирует экономику транзакционных издержек (ТСЕ), теорию агентских отношений и ресурсную теорию. В совокупности эти аналитические подходы постулируют, что аутсорсинг способен снизить затраты, повысить стандарты услуг и освободить государственные органы для сосредоточения на приоритетных задачах, что подкреплено количественными данными: федеральный IT-аутсорсинг США обеспечил снижение затрат на 23% (2018–2023), инфраструктурные проекты ГЧП Великобритании принесли экономию 18% по сравнению с традиционными закупками, аутсорсинг цифровых услуг Швеции сократил время обработки на 35%, а платформа общих услуг Австралии снизила административные расходы на 27%. Структурированное сравнение практик аутсорсинга в США, Великобритании, Швеции, Канаде и Австралии показывает, как национальные приоритеты формируют выбор модели и архитектуру контроля. Выявлены три доминирующие конфигурации: контрактный аутсорсинг для стандартизированных повторяющихся задач, государственно-частные партнерства для капиталоемкой инфраструктуры и стратегические альянсы для инновационно ориентированных сфер услуг. Признавая, что эти достижения сопровождаются управленческими вызовами, включая усиление зависимости от подрядчиков и сложности контроля качества, исследование обосновывает необходимость контекстуально откалиброванных стратегий аутсорсинга и адаптируемых контрольных механизмов как предпосылок устойчивого повышения эффективности государственного сектора.

Ключевые слова: государственное управление, модели аутсорсинга, эффективность, государственные структуры, теоретические основы, государственный сектор, государстенно-частное партнерство.

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